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ABSTRACT  
 
The purpose of this paper is to design a conceptual model of institutional elements for the 
building of a client-supplier strategic partnership in IT outsourcing, involving an ERP 
system licensing. This model resulted from a case study in a Brazilian transnational bank, 
which is one of the 10 largest American banks in terms of assets volume. Qualitative 
content analysis technique evaluated the data collected from interviews, documents, and 
observations. The results show the importance of a multidimensional institutional 
perspective with a set of regulative, normative, and cognitive elements to structure a 
client-supplier partnership. The data analysis confirmed elements predefined in the theory 
developed, as well as identified new ones. 
Keywords: Offshore IT outsourcing; strategic partnership; ERP system; institutional 
theory. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The outsourcing of information technology (IT) refers to the transfer of part of the 
internal IT services of one organization (client) to another (supplier), by means of a 
contract. The process usually includes the transfer of decision-making rights over 
production factors (people, facilities, equipment, technology, and other assets) related to 
these services (Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000). In exchange, for an established period, 
the client pays the supplier for the management of its assets and for the provision of IT 
services (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992). 
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The IT outsourcing arrangement of particular interest to this study is the licensing 
of an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system. The ERP is “a comprehensive body 
of activities sustained by several modules of application software [IS] which help the 
industrialist or another business manager to manage important parts of his/her 
business…” (Foldoc, 2011). Standardizing and speeding up processes, standardizing 
human resources information, integrating financial information, integrating customer 
order information and reducing inventory are the five major reasons why companies 
decide for an ERP project (Nazemi, Tarokh, and Djavanshir, 2012). 
The licensing of ERP systems shows a failure average rate above 60% in terms of 
implementation time, costs over budget and benefits realization, according to a research 
performed by Panorama Consulting Group (2011) in the second half of 2010, involving 
185 organizations from 57 countries. The situation can be worse if the client chooses an 
offshore supplier (located in another country), when several barriers can arise for client-
supplier relationship, being among them (Simon, Poston and Kettinger, 2009; Momoh 
and Shehab, 2010; Sousa, Giardino and Trezza, 2011; Khan, Niazi and Ahmad, 2011; 
Amid, Moalagh and Ravazan, 2012): mismatch in culture, value, and norms; geo-
politics instability; imperfect information about the suppliers; unrealistic expectations 
on cost savings; differences in time zones; knowledge transfer difficulties in both 
directions (client-supplier); layoff and loss of human capital; location of client and 
supplier team members; lack of project management; lack of protection for intellectual 
property rights; lack of due diligence resulting from offshore bandwagon mindset; lack 
of top management support; lack of technical capability; high system complexity; and 
key users with poor skills. 
Moreover, Lee and Kim (1999) posit that organizations (clients) face difficulties 
to form and manage the relationship with their suppliers when a relationship based only 
on a contract (arm’s length) is changed to a partnership one. Partnership is a cooperating 
relationship alternative (Tomlinson, 2005), mainly when the focus is the quality of the 
services or products involved (Collins, 1997). Macedo-Soares (2011) asserts that firms 
are more and more competing globally through partnerships, despite new paradigms and 
managerial tools to manage them. Klepper (1995) considers client-supplier strategic 
partnership in IT outsourcing as a complex phenomena and suggests a close 
examination to understand and manage this relationship dynamics, through the 
integration of a set of elements derived from several theories. 
Kern and Willcocks (2002) suggest further an investigation about the 
institutionalization process of the client-supplier relationship in IT outsourcing, when 
they applied the Interaction Model (Hakansson, 1982) to explore this relationship in 12 
client organizations. IT governance is about institutionalized practices through 
processes (ITGI, 2012) and the adoption of an institutional theoretical perspective 
contributes with elements from economic, political, and social orders (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991).  
The banking sector is exposed to “very highly technical and institutional 
pressures”, as “they face both efficiency/effectiveness demands as well as pressures to 
conform to procedural requirements” (Scott and Meyer, 1991, p. 123). In this sense, an 
ERP is an alternative for them to advance in new markets as those of foreign countries, 
as it manages through their modules several business processes of a branch - products, 
accounting, customer relationship, payments, funds transfers, current and saving 
accounts, and so on. 
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In this context of institutionalization process and banking sector, the following 
question guides this research: What are the institutional elements for the successful 
building of a client-supplier strategic partnership in IT outsourcing through the licensing 
of a transnational banking ERP system? To answer this question, this research adopted 
the strategy of a single case study in a transnational Brazilian bank.   
 
2. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN IT OUTSOURCING 
Anderson and Narus (1990, p. 46) describe relationship satisfaction as “a focal 
consequence of a working partnership” between a client and a supplier. In the IT 
outsourcing context, Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996) define partnership as interactive 
relationships of long standing that contribute to client-supplier relationship success. The 
essential characteristic of a strategic partnership is the cooperation of the partners (Das 
and Teng, 1998; Tomlinson, 2005). Morgan and Hunt (1994) say “cooperation 
promotes the success of the [client-supplier] relationship.” 
The cooperation of the partners occurs when the “business partner wish to pursue 
mutual compatible interests in the alliance, instead of acting in an opportunistic way” 
(Das and Teng, 1998, p. 492). Opportunism links to egotistical behavior and bad faith 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 26-27). Thus, there must be incentives in the client-supplier 
cooperation to inhibit opportunism and promote an environment of trust in their 
relationship (Collins, 1997). To Blumberg (2001, p. 828), “commitments can reduce the 
motivations to opportunism while establishing additional costs to such behavior.”  
Commitment means the goodwill to exert a maximum effort towards the 
continuation of the long-standing partnership (Wilson, 2000, p. 250). Hagen and Choe 
(1998, p. 589-590) define trust as the “expectation that one can depend on the promises 
of the other and that the other will act in a cooperative spirit towards the one who 
trusted him in unforeseen circumstances”. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) sustain the need 
of a strong trust in strategic partnerships. ERP implementations that meet clients´ 
process needs normally are not fast and the client-supplier cooperation in this scenario 
is very critical (Anderson, Banker, Menon and Romero, 2011) for the partnership 
between them. 
2.1 Commitment-trust theory 
In the context of the commitment-trust theory, Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 22) 
consider that “commitment and trust lead directly to cooperative behaviors, which are 
pointers to the success of the partnership [in the long run]”. They point out the reduction 
of opportunism, communication quality, and shared values in the generation of trust 
between client and supplier from a partnership perspective. Shared values are also a 
factor that generates commitment in this kind of partnership. One partner commits only 
to whom he or she trusts, explaining the positive influence of trust on commitment. 
Coercive power, when one part imposes itself upon the dependent one, results from the 
costs of change and from the benefits generated by the partnership, besides being a 
destructive factor for both commitment and trust.  
To Grover et al. (1996), the benefits that a client receives from IT outsourcing 
may be of an economic (cost reduction), strategic (access to distinctive competencies, 
competitive advantage, etc.), and/or technological (access to latest technology) nature. 
The costs of change are the costs of ending the partnership (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Communication, although associated with the exchange of information between the 
parties (Mohr and Spekman, 1994), happens through the formal and informal sharing of 
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significant information (technical, strategic or operational), which engenders trust 
between them (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Lee and Choi (2011) identify on-going trust 
in client-supplier relationship as a requirement to IT outsourcing benefits. 
2.2 Model of the institutional elements 
The commitment-trust theory does not explore in depth the perspective of either 
partner, since commitment and trust dimensions do not discriminate their influence in a 
specific partner, be client or supplier. Thus, based on the commitment-trust theory 
model (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), this study presents a model of institutional elements 
with the aim of outlining the client view regarding IT client-supplier strategic 
partnership, according to Figure 1. An institutional approach gives the opportunity to 
identify and integrate regulatory, normative and cognitive elements derived from 
several theories  (Scott, 2001, p. 51) - the purpose of this study - to institutionalize the 
process of client-supplier relationship. 
Client 
Commitment 
Shared Values 
Supplier 
Commitment 
Client 
Trust 
Client-Supplier 
Communication 
Normative 
Elements 
Cognitive 
Elements 
Regulatory 
Elements 
Costs of 
Change 
Benefits 
Client-Supplier 
Cooperation 
Strategic Partnership 
Dimensions 
from client perspective 
 
Figure 1 - Model of the institutional elements of the IT strategic partnership 
The reduced opportunism of the supplier is represented by its commitment to the 
partnership with the client. This commitment exerts a positive influence on client trust 
(calculative trust), there being neither the need for opportunism consideration with its 
negative influence on the client trust, nor for regulatory elements to mitigate its 
existence. Nor is the coercive power considered, since the model outlines the 
relationship between partners and the commitment-trust theory itself treats its influence 
as a non-assessed hypothesis.  
2.2.1 Regulatory Elements 
Regulatory elements aim at controlling behavior, which is rational and moved 
only by the interests of the parties (Williamson, 1975). This control occurs through the 
establishment of rules that punish through penalties or that reward through incentives, 
according to a formal agreement signed by the parties - client and supplier. The power 
that characterizes the regulatory dimension must be legitimized based on a “normative 
frame that both restricts and supports the use of power” (Scott, 2001, p. 53), which 
makes the regulatory and normative dimensions interdependent.  
The transaction cost economic theory indicates some safeguards – or regulatory 
elements – capable to minimize transaction costs in the client-supplier relationship 
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(Williamson, 1985, p. 60, 62, 167; Williamson, 1996, p. 124), as a consequence of 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985, p. 32): multiple sourcing (or alternative suppliers); 
reciprocal exposure when investing in assets (or hostage); periodic contract renewal; 
and reputation.  The mechanism of multiple sourcing puts the suppliers in a competitive 
environment to serve the client, which induces the quality of the goods and services 
involved in the transaction between them (Williamson, 1985, p. 61).  
Hostage occurs when they invest in assets dedicated to their relationship, which 
demonstrate the actual commitment of both to the future of their exchanges, mitigating 
the exposure of the one of them to the opportunism of the other, since they will share 
possible value losses of those assets. Examples of supplier investments are material 
assets, new facilities, and personnel training (Bahli and Rivard, 2003). Also, if the 
contract is flexible to face unforeseen events and permits agreements through its 
periodical reviews (Williamson, 1985, p. 62), it generates economies at the transaction 
cost level for the client-supplier relationship.  
Further, depending on the idiosyncrasy of the assets involved in the services 
agreed, the long-term duration of the contract indicates the importance attributed to the 
relationship by the partners, as foreseen in the game theory applied to Political Science 
(Axelrod, 1984). The development of IS (or software) is an idiosyncratic service 
(Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 2004). This is the situation of a client licensing an ERP 
system from a supplier, which involves IS development by the latter as a service to the 
former, mainly in the process of this system customization for the client needs and the 
client participation in the management of its implementation. 
The reputation effect to the partners happens when one of them does not fulfill 
what the agreement establishes, having a negative effect on the present and future 
businesses of the given partner (Williamson, 1985, p. 395). But, reputation effect 
happens only if the lack of fulfillment is open to public knowledge, its consequences are 
clear and provable, and the part that suffers the lack of fulfillment of the agreement 
penalizes the responsible one. 
The agency theory strives to identify the most efficient form of contract to the 
agency relationship, in a situation of potential divergence of interests between principal 
and agent, which strengthens the conditions of opportunism and uncertainty outcome to 
the fulfillment of the expected results (Eisenhardt, 1985). Thus the “control system 
[about the behavior and/or results] evaluates and pays [based on performance], 
motivates behavior [as established by the economic theory regarding transaction costs] 
and also alters the standard of risk sharing” (Eisenhardt, 1985, p. 137), which becomes 
more balanced between the principal and the agent and, in this way, motivates 
cooperating efforts between them in the relationship. The pricing model must fit these 
aspects.  
Furthermore, regarding the pricing model, the use of service level agreement is 
common in the IT client-supplier relationship. This corresponds to the mandatory 
acceptance by the supplier to reach certain levels of performance agreed with the client, 
as well as supplying rights and solutions to the client (Click and Duening, 2005, p. 119). 
Thus, the following propositions are posited: 
P1a: Alternative suppliers are a regulatory element in the IT strategic partnership; 
P1b: Hostage is a regulatory element in the IT strategic partnership; 
P1c: Periodic contract renewal is a regulatory element in the IT strategic 
partnership; 
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P1d: Long-term contract is a regulatory element in the IT strategic partnership; 
P1e: Reputation is a regulatory element in the IT strategic partnership; 
P1f: Pricing model is a regulatory element in the IT strategic partnership; and 
P1g: Service level agreement is a regulatory element in the IT strategic 
partnership. 
2.2.2 Normative Elements 
The prescriptive concept of the institutions derives from Emile Durkheim and 
Talcott Parsons sociological studies, as seen in their focus on family groups, social 
classes, religious systems and voluntary associations, where beliefs and common values 
are more often than not present (Scott, 2001, p. 55). The reference standards emphasize 
the “normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and mandatory dimension 
to social life” involving both values as norms (Scott, 2001, p. 54). Durkheim (1984, p. 
28-29) postulates that the order component of social solidarity is the authority of the 
legal rules, as defined either formally or by common use.  
These rules offer a positive contribution that is a cooperative contribution derived 
essentially from work division (Durkheim, 1984, p. 77). Law, however, is not the only 
form to regulate cooperation between the parties. There is another element that comes 
from moral aspects (Durkheim, 1984, p. 162). While the contractual relationship lasts, 
both parties must respect the rules either in a direct or indirect way. These rules, whose 
order is social (as is that of the law), even if not sanctioned by a legal code, also carry a 
binding character, although in a diffuse way.  
Thus, rules of a purely moral character or collective practices under the protection 
of public opinion follow legal rules. These rules of moral order compel individuals to 
act according to the ends that are not their own, implying mutual allowances, agreeing 
to commitments and considering the interest of the others as superior to their own 
(Durkheim, 1984, p. 173). In other words, this kind of rules imposes flexibility on self-
interests (Durkheim, 1984, p. 174). Macneil (1980) characterizes these rules as 
relational norms. They involve behavioral expectations which “occur in relations, must 
occur in relations if the relations are expected to last and must occur as long as their 
continuation is prized [by the parties]” (Macneil, 1980, p. 64). 
Dunning and Lundan (2010, p. 1229) state the multiplication of uncertainties in 
the human environment, “primarily due to the incommensurability and/or opaqueness of 
the norms and values that guide decision-making processes and that provide the 
rationale for the design of the formal institutional system”. Parsons (1964a, p. 118-119), 
who learned from cognitive psychology, refers to value as the orientation element that is 
common to social interaction. Values are normative standards that describe a desired 
social system, while norms contextualize these standards to specific situations and 
members, defining the desired expectations and the rewards or penalties to apply 
(Parsons, 1964b, p. 124).  
The norms, nomenclature adopted in this paper (legal norms and relational 
norms), have the power to reduce the political manipulation by the individual on their 
own interest, binding them not only to the laws but also to the description of jobs, 
procedures for activity performances, standards of quality, etc. (Scott, 2001, p. 55). 
Thus, the following propositions are posited: 
P2a: Legal norms are normative elements in the IT strategic partnership; and 
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P2b: Relational norms are normative elements in the IT strategic partnership. 
2.2.3 Cognitive Elements 
The cognitive dimension of the institutions exploits “the central role performed by 
the construction socially mediated by a common referential frame of meanings” (Scott, 
2001, p. 58), while cognitive elements refer to the “shared assumptions which constitute 
the nature of social reality and the frames through which the meaning is built”. Hence, 
emphasis is on “the cognitive dimensions of human existence” (Scott, 2001, p. 57), 
where the relationship between culture and cognition arises from the fact that external 
cultural environment models the internal interpretative processes of the individuals. 
The cultural-cognitive perspective comes from the cognitive science studies 
developed at the Carnegie School (USA) by Herbert Simon and James March 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 18), as well as by Harold Garfinkel in 
ethnomethodology studies, a student of Parsons (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 19) 
who based his work on the studies of Alfred Schultz in phenomenology (Garfinkel, 
1967, p. 76). In ethnomethodology, Garfinkel (1967, p. 76) considers that “descriptions 
from the point of view of the interests of the collectivity members in the management of 
their practical affairs” are the bases of social life. These descriptions are the knowledge 
shared and used by the collectivity members to communicate with each other 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 77). Giddens (1984, p. 29) mentions communication as one of the 
dimensions that structures social interaction from a shared cognitive perspective.  
Hakansson (1982) highlights the importance of communication during the 
institutionalization of a long-standing client-supplier relationship, while Dey, Clegg and 
Bennett (2010) point out communication as a major risk factor to an ERP 
implementation. In this context, Khan et al. (2011), through an extensive literature 
review regarding offshore software development outsourcing, identified language and 
cultural issues as an outstanding barrier for client-supplier relationship success in IS 
development outsourcing.  
In an interdependent relationship between the parties, typical of a strategic 
partnership, Sheppard and Sherman (1998) consider essential the capacity to exchange 
information. Sharing meanings and interpretations, or cognitive sharing, allows 
communication of a better quality (Lander, Purvis, McGray and Leigh, 2004) and 
contributes to a framework of trust between the partners (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 
121). It provides “the necessary basis to a non-opportunistic behavior”, while avoiding 
the development of asymmetric power (Hardy, Phillips and Lawrence, 1998, p. 69). 
Willcocks, Lacity and Kern (1999) mention the risks of power asymmetry development 
that benefits the supplier in the post-transitional phase of IT outsourcing, while Kwahk 
and Ahn (2010) point out the negative impact of client-supplier misfits due to different 
countries on ERP implementation success. Thus, the following proposition is posited: 
P3: Common language is a cognitive element in  IT strategic partnership. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
The nature of this research is descriptive-exploratory through a single case study 
strategy, as the phenomenon under study is contemporary, not easily dissociable from 
its context and characterized as a “technically unique situation in which there might be 
many more variables of interest than data points” (Yin, 2001, p. 32). The case study 
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“contributes in a unique way to the understanding of individual, social and political 
phenomena” (Yin, 2001, p. 67), which includes organizational processes. 
Further, this research follows both Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 34) criteria for a 
case study adoption: a) a politically important case, because of its relevant 
characteristics to the moment, as its is related to a bank strategy to a better position in 
international markets; b) a timely case, when the aim is the one of investigating new 
trends or unexpected events, as the unit of analysis is related to a strategic project under 
occurrence; and c) a convenient case, considering the aspects of less time, cost and 
effort, as the researcher has easy access to the case study data. 
3.1 Place and unit of analysis 
Brazilian banks are relevant to this research because they strongly use IT in the 
distribution of their products and services, as well as in the automation of their internal 
affairs. In 2010, according to Febraban (2010), Brazilian banks expended an amount of 
US$ 11.8 billion in IT and invested US$ 895 million in the acquisition of third-party 
software and applications, this last one representing a growth of 8% in relation to the 
previous year.  
The Brazilian bank under study, which this study identifies as BANK, is among 
the three largest Brazilian banks and one of the 10 largest in America in terms of assets 
volume; has a base of more than 50 million customers; has a working staff of over 100 
thousand employees; in 2010 had net profits of over US$ 10 billion and total assets of 
over US$ 800 billion; and has more than 10 thousand service points with automated 
teller machines (all services and operations are made in real time). This level of 
automation characterizes BANK as the one that invests in IT the most. In 2011, it 
invested about US$ 650 million, which represented approximately a quarter of the 
volume invested by the Brazilian banking sector (US$ 2.66 billion). 
The unit of analysis – the case – is the building process of the client-supplier 
strategic partnership in the IT outsourcing, involving licensing of a banking ERP system 
by BANK (client) from an offshore supplier. The purpose of this licensing is the 
businesses processes automation of BANK´s international branches. A specific project 
of   BANK conducted the process of licensing of the ERP system, identified in this 
paper as SYSINTBRAN – System for the Automation of the International Branches [of 
BANK]. The acquisition and implementation costs of the system, including hardware 
and telecommunication infrastructure, will be above US$ 25 million.  
The ERP system will have a great impact on the businesses of BANK´s 
international branches and on the way BANK manages them. It will reduce costs related 
to the actual replicated structures of IT abroad; automate the businesses of BANK´s 
international branches; redesign the management processes of these branches; process in 
a centralized way at BANK´s IT headquarters, located in Brazil; standardize the actual 
different routines used by international branches; integrate the international branches 
with current BANK´s processes, including not only its legacy systems, but also its 
management practices (accounting, auditing, customer relationship, and policies for 
products and services); and mitigate the actual operational risks with the current three 
ERP systems used by international branches, which have several  deficiencies related to 
their obsolescence. These systems do not provide strategic, economic, or technological 
benefits to BANK. Moreover, the licensing of an ERP system is a fast way for a bank to 
put in place the best practices in the banking industry (technology infrastructure, 
businesses, electronic security, compliance to norms, etc.), mainly when the target 
market is abroad. 
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3.2 Procedures for data collection, analysis and reliability 
Documents, observation and interviews were the data sources for analysis 
purposes of this study. The documents studied were BANK´s IT policy for its 
international branches, minutes of the meetings between BANK and ERP systems 
suppliers that were candidates in the selection process, ERP system requirements listed 
by BANK, software license agreement signed by BANK and the supplier selected, and 
other documents from the SYSINTBRAN project, mainly those used to support its 
steering committee´s decisions.  
Between October 2007 and February 2008, the researcher´s observation happened 
during BANK´s meetings with the ERP system supplier better ranked in the selection 
process, as well as during a workshop organized by BANK with this supplier for the 
presentation of its ERP system. From 2009 to 2011, the researcher´s observation 
happened as a participant during the implementation process of the ERP system in 
BANK´s European Branches. In August 2008, BANK signed the license agreement 
contract to implement this ERP system in its international branches. This 
implementation is under way in the European Branches and is scheduled to happen in 
the Branches located in other continents – South America, North America and Asia - 
until 2014. 
In total, the researcher interviewed 20 BANK´s employees with direct or indirect 
involvement in the SYSINTBRAN project, during the period between December 2005 
and April 2007. These employees authorized the researcher to record the interviews, 
who transcribed them for analysis purposes. Table 1 shows the profile of the employees 
interviewed according to their departments, as well as the date, duration and the 
interaction form of the interview (i.e., whether the researcher was personally present or 
performed Internet/Skype™ calls).  
For the analysis of the data collected from the documents, interviews and 
researcher observation, this study applied qualitative content analysis technique through 
categorical analysis (Bardin, 1977, p. 153). The unit of significance, or register, was 
themes (thematic analysis). In this way, the categorization criterion was semantic and 
not syntactic (aggregating verbs, adjectives, pronouns, etc.) or lexical (aggregating by 
the sense of the words) (Bardin, 1977, p. 118). The themes are clippings of units with 
variable length extensions, including several sentences. 
For the categorization of the themes this study developed a category-system, 
which was not sufficiently exhaustive to restrict the analysis (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p. 85) and, consequently, jeopardize the perception of unusual data having 
important significance to the research (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). Regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutional elements already presented in this study formed 
the category-system, which was the basis of the protocol used for data collection during 
the interviews, observations and documents.   
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Table 1 - Characteristics of the interviews 
Departments Employee Profile Date Duration Form 
International 
Businesses 
01 business 
manager 
29.09.2006 31min44sec In person 
01 project manager 29.09.2006 1h03min51sec In person 
01 project manager 
30.04.2007 1h40min12sec In person 
Information 
Technology 
01 project manager 
02 IT consultants 29.04.2007 40min29sec In person 
01 IT manager 
(in Europe) 
09.12.2005 35min19sec In person 
13.12.2005 25min55sec In person 
Organizational 
Strategy 
01 project 
consultant 
29.04.2007 8min43sec In person 
01 project 
consultant 
30.04.2007 14min05sec In person 
International 
Branches  
(in Europe) 
01 manager 15.12.2005 33min40sec In person 
01 manager 16.12.2005 24min30sec In person 
03 managers 13.12.2005 22min30sec In person 
02 managers 16.01.2006 16min Internet/Skype™ 
01 manager 21.12.2005 43min In person 
02 managers 27.12.2005 28min35sec In person 
01 manager 13.01.2006 16min15sec Internet/Skype™ 
 
The regulatory elements of the category-system are: alternative suppliers 
(Williamson, 1985; Hagen and Choe, 1998), hostage (Williamson, 1985; Somaya, Kim 
and Vonortas, 2010), periodic contract renewal (Williamson, 1985; Bahli and Rivard, 
2003), long-term contract (Axelrod, 1984), reputation (Williamson, 1985), pricing 
model (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001, p. 168) and service level agreement (Cullen and 
Willcocks, 2003, p. 73); the normative elements are legal norms (Durkheim, 1984) and 
relational norms (Macneil, 1980); and the cognitive element is the common language 
(Ge and Voβ, 2009; Khan et al., 2011). 
The reliability of the study derives from the use of several sources of evidence, 
allowing data triangulation (Yin, 2001, p. 119-128). Moreover, it derives from the 
following criteria recommended by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 92): a) referential 
adequacy, which reviews the analysis at a later time of the research from the stored data; 
b) precise description of the data sources, data collection procedures, methods of 
analysis, and protocols; and c) member verification, or the verification of the results by 
the research respondents, considered the most important criterion for the reliability of a 
study with a qualitative approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 92). 
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
From BANK´s perspective (client), Figure 2 illustrates the model of the 
institutional elements of the strategic partnership in IT outsourcing, as a result of the 
analysis. The model is segmented into regulatory, normative and cognitive institutional 
elements, which are the ones for establishing a strategic partnership between BANK and 
its ERP system supplier (“... in a philosophical view, what we are going to search is a 
partnership relationship where I open a market for an enterprise and it brings me a good 
solution and helps me to build things which I will need over time… ” – a quotation from 
one of the project managers). 
Periodic Contract Renewal 
Hostage 
Reputation 
Long Term Contract 
Alternative Suppliers 
Unit Pricing 
Risk and Rewards Sharing 
Fixed Pricing 
Sequential Implementation 
Due Diligence 
Service Level Agreements 
Strategic Partnership 
Dimensions 
from client perspective 
Client 
Commitment 
Client-Supplier 
Cooperation 
Shared Values 
Supplier 
Commitment 
Client 
Trust 
Client-Supplier 
Communication 
Normative 
Elements 
Cognitive 
Elements 
Regulatory 
Elements 
Costs of  
Change 
Benefits 
Quality Certification 
Information Exchange 
Arbitration Rules 
Solidarity 
Contract laws 
Flexibility 
Project Management Model 
Common Language 
Function Oriented Metrics 
Requirements Specification 
ERP and Technology Expertise 
 
Figure 2 - Model of the institutional elements of the strategic partnership in IT outsourcing 
4.1 Regulatory categories 
Data analysis confirmed the regulatory elements – alternative suppliers, hostage, 
periodic contract renewal, long-term contract, reputation, pricing model, and service 
level agreement – all of them pertaining to the category-system and related to the 
propositions P1a to P1g, respectively. Although the analysis confirmed periodic 
contract renewal category, it is specific for maintenance services (“… error-corrections, 
procedural questions, recovery and backup information, and general consultation 
exist...” – maintenance clause of the contract), not for the survival of the software 
license agreement, which is perpetual. Thus, both client and supplier consider the 
importance of their relationship future.  
The analysis of the pricing model category allowed the identification of three 
correspondent subcategories (Click and Duening, 2005, p. 122-123): a) fixed pricing, 
established for the duration of the agreement, it allows the client to know in advance the 
supplier price for future services, but requires a clear scope definition of the service and 
of effective metrics before signing the contract; b) unit pricing, by which the client 
assumes a predetermined rate the supplier will apply to at particular level of service; and 
c) risk and reward sharing, as client and supplier have an amount of money at risk and 
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the supplier gains a percentage of client profits, if the performance of the service 
provided is optimal and supports client business objectives. This last form of pricing is 
typical in client-supplier strategic partnership involving IT outsourcing (Lacity and 
Willcocks, 2001, p. 168) and is related to distributive fairness in the relationship, 
meaning contributions shared according to the value produced by each of the partners 
(Ariño and Ring, 2010). 
There are four forms of pricing in the agreement negotiated between BANK and 
the selected supplier: a) a license fee, that entitles BANK to use the system pursuant to 
the agreement and as per the scope defined, based on a limit of concurrent users, 
customer accounts, and Internet subscribers (BANK´s customers accessing the ERP 
system through Internet Banking investments); b) maintenance charges, a percentage 
(22%) over the license fee that must be paid annually; and c) customization charges that 
BANK must pay for any customization it requests to be developed by the supplier in the 
system, as those to explore new business opportunities or to comply with norms, be 
internal (internal controls) or external (central banking norms) to  BANK. If concurrent 
users, customer accounts, or Internet subscribers increase or decrease to certain levels 
established in the license agreement, BANK pays an additional license fee or receives a 
discount, respectively. This study considers license fee and annual maintenance charges 
in the fixed pricing subcategory; customization charges in the unit pricing subcategory; 
and the possibility of BANK paying more or receiving discounts over the license fee 
(levels of concurrent users, customer accounts, and Internet subscribers) in the risk and 
reward sharing subcategory.  
The data analysis identified due diligence as a new category, meaning the 
inspection or auditing of the information provided by the supplier (Click and Duening, 
2005, p. 94-109). This category encompasses BANK´s visits to the supplier’s clients; 
the workshop when the supplier presented the functionalities and technical architecture 
of the ERP system and when BANK could identify gaps for its requirements; and ERP 
performance tests by specialized companies. A final regulatory category is the 
sequential implementation of the ERP system. This manner of implementation is 
adequate when the ERP system is not uniform in its functionalities to serve different 
countries (Madapusi and D’Souza, 2005), as it is the situation of BANK´s international 
branches. Furthermore, it allows a controlled implementation tied to the payments by 
BANK to the supplier, which is an instrument for BANK´s decision to continue in the 
relationship in case of dissatisfaction with the supplier services. 
4.2 Normative categories 
Data analysis confirmed legal norms and relational norms categories, which are 
related to the propositions P2a and P2b, respectively. The exploration of these 
categories, however, allowed for the identification of contract laws and arbitration rules 
subcategories linked to legal norms; and flexibility, information exchange, and 
solidarity, bounded to the relational norms. The contract laws enforce the agreement´s 
credibility. Besides the British law, the agreement considers the German, American, and 
Indian laws in regulating its long-term duration.  
In a different way from the German law, the British law does not give adequate 
support to client-supplier relationships (Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1997, p. 111). 
Arbitration rules, which are related to all disputes, controversies and differences of 
opinion arising out of or in connection with the agreement, are subject to the 
International Chamber of Commerce, according to the contract signed between BANK 
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and the supplier select by the SYSINTBRAN project. In this way, contract laws and 
arbitration rules categories provide the legal norms for client-supplier solidarity. 
Based on Macneil (1980) relational norms, Heide and John (1992) identify three 
elements: a) flexibility, as a bilateral expectation or willingness in making contract 
adaptations according to circumstantial changes; b) information exchanges, as a 
bilateral expectation that the parties will proactively supply useful information among 
themselves; and c) solidarity, as a bilateral expectation that the relationship is of high 
importance, prescribing behaviors directly related to its continuation. 
Scott (2001, p. 52) mentions certification as a normative element when moral 
recognition supports institutionalization. Thus, the norms of quality certification are 
“standards through which structures or behaviors can be compared and valued” (Scott, 
2001, p. 54-55) or “the understanding of fair practices in business” (Scott, 2001, p. 55). 
Thus, this study identifies the quality certification category as a new normative element, 
since BANK considers the importance of the suppliers having ISO 9001 and CMM-I 
certifications, which induces quality in their software development processes. 
4.3 Cognitive categories 
Data analysis confirmed the common language category related to proposition P3. 
It represents the sharing of meanings that permits conversations during the 
communication process (Lander et al., 2004), and, thus, information exchange between 
the parties involved (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998; Simon, Poston and Kettinger, 2009). 
It links to the need of a common language to establish the communication between 
BANK and the suppliers’ representatives. The suppliers’ representatives did not speak 
the native language (Portuguese) of BANK´s representatives, but spoke English. In this 
context, one crucial requirement from BANK´s side to exchange information with the 
suppliers was the use of the English language as a common language.  
English fluency of the last manager of the SYSINTBRAN project was decisive to 
speed up the conclusion of the relationship building process, through the selection of 
one of the ERP systems. This manager considered English fluency as an important 
criterion to select members to SYSINTBRAN project, because of the need to establish 
conversations with the suppliers (“… in some cases, I consider English fluency more 
important than technical abilities to understand what the suppliers say…” – a quotation 
from the last SYSINTBRAN project manager). Ge and Voβ (2009) have already 
highlighted the importance of cultural and language aspects to ERP implementation 
success.  
Four new categories were identified in this study - function point metrics, 
requirements specification, project management model, and ERP and Technology 
Expertise. Function point metrics are productivity metrics that allow projections of the 
cost and effort in the software development process (Pressman, 1995, p. 64, 105). Thus, 
knowledge sharing with regard to the development efforts of the supplier for new 
functionalities in the ERP system allows the client to evaluate how fair the service is, 
avoiding situations of opportunism by the latter. Function point metrics supports unit 
pricing, being an example of the integration between regulatory and cognitive elements.  
BANK already adopts function point metrics to estimate about inputs, outputs, 
data files, queries and external interfaces (Leffingwell and Widrig, 2000, p. 105) of an 
IS. The supplier who signed the license agreement with BANK adopts this kind of 
metrics (“We use the function point technique....” – quotation from a supplier 
representative observed by the researcher).  
74  Roses, L.K. 
 
JISTEM, Brazil Vol. 10, No.1, Jan/Apr 2013,  pp. 61-80         www.jistem.fea.usp.br           
Requirements specification is the basis to agree about services requests from 
BANK related to ERP customizations by the supplier. The requirements of the system 
are the criteria by who develops (supplier) an IS and who demands (client) it can assess 
the respective quality of the service (Pressman, 1995, p. 232). Requirements are the 
client´s needs or what the system must comply with (Leffingwell and Widrig, 2000, p. 
231). They must be documented in such a way to facilitate a common understanding 
between client and supplier to assure deliverables by the latter according to the former´s 
expectations.  
UML – Unified Modeling Language –, e.g., is a kind of requirements 
specification language whose purpose is to “specify, visualize, document and design 
artifacts of a system and can be used with all processes along with the development 
cycle [of an IS or software, including ERP customizations] and through several 
implementation technologies” (Furlan, 1998, p. 33). The supplier uses its own model of 
document to specify the requirements and share them with BANK for analysis and 
agreement purpose. Sometimes, requirements documents are exchanged several times 
between the supplier and BANK until they agree on them.  
The third new category identified - project management model - involves the 
establishment of a process to organize the communication between client and supplier. 
This model must encompass a plan to follow up schedule, deliverables, staff allocation, 
etc., of the project implementation. It can be based on traditional frameworks as 
PMBOK (PMI, 2008). BANK has a Program Management Office based on PMBOK 
practices. Nevertheless, a common set of documents, decision structure and meetings 
were established to facilitate a common follow-up of the project progress with the 
supplier. 
The fourth and last new cognitive category found - ERP and Technology 
Expertise – has a major impact on the ERP implementation, as it is related to the 
availability of the appropriate knowledge and skills about the ERP and related 
technology from both supplier and client. The allocation of unskilled personal from the 
supplier side was seen by the SYSINTBRAN project as a factor of many delays in the 
ERP implementation, as well as to several quality issues (“… the system didn´t reach 
the expected quality by Bank, which caused the systematic of reprogramming the 
implementation due dates.” – quotation in the project document to review the 
expenditures and implementation dates, as observed by the researcher). On the other 
hand, it was observed that the client staff training on the ERP functionalities and this 
staff allocation with IT and business background skills linked to the ERP business 
processes and technology was a critical success factor, sometimes helping to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the supplier´s staff skills. Ilfinedo (2011) highlights 
the importance of the ERP external expertise to support the client during its 
implementation, besides the client having internally related skills.  
 
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This paper developed a model of the institutional elements for client-supplier 
strategic partnership building in IT outsourcing, through the process of licensing an 
ERP system. Those elements, studied from the perspective of the client (BANK), have 
the power to afford supplier commitment to the relationship as well as client trust in the 
supplier. In this sense, they are elements of a cooperative client-supplier relationship. 
Cooperation is the foundation for a successful client-supplier relationship (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994) in the sense of a partnership. Consequently, this study considers these 
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institutional elements as key factors for client-supplier partnership success in IT 
outsourcing.  
Client trust has three dimensions, according to the institutional elements: 
calculative, normative, and cognitive. The categories alternative suppliers, hostage, 
periodic contract renewal, reputation, long-term contract, pricing model (fixed pricing, 
unit pricing, and risk and reward sharing), service level agreement, due diligence, and 
sequential implementation are regulatory institutional elements that contribute to the 
supplier commitment in the relationship with the client. Also, supplier commitment is 
an inductive factor for calculative trust of the client in the supplier. 
The categories legal norms (contract laws and arbitration rules), relational norms 
(flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity), and quality certification are 
normative institutional elements, which contribute to the normative trust of the client in 
the supplier. The categories common language, function-oriented metrics, requirements 
specification, project management model, and ERP and Technology Expertise are 
cognitive institutional elements. The first allows information exchange between BANK 
and the foreign suppliers that participated in the ERP selection process; the second, 
permits BANK to foresee the real costs of the supplier services; the third, supports the 
management of the day-to-day interaction with the supplier regarding the follow-up of 
the activities going on and that must be set to achieve the project implementation, as 
well as resources allocation, services payments, structure of management, project status 
reports, etc.; and the fourth, to support the ERP implementation in terms of its 
technological infrastructure and support for user acceptance tests. 
The results of this study contribute to a client-supplier relationship in IT 
outsourcing, through the application of a multidimensional perspective based on the 
institutional theory. From this standpoint, it highlights elements from several theories 
and integrates them as drivers to the supplier commitment and to the client trust in their 
relationship, starting from the commitment-trust theory as a theoretical basis. The 
results also contribute to organizational practice, since it explores a contemporary 
phenomenon and identifies elements that serve as references for the successful 
institutionalization of the IT outsourcing in the context of ERP system licensing. In this 
sense, it is important to posit that a successful ERP implementation from a technical and 
relational standpoint will have a positive impact on its use for business purposes (Zhu, 
Li, Wang and Chen, 2010; Velcu, 2010; Law, Chen and Wu, 2010). 
The institutional elements here identified may improve the management processes 
to sustain an offshore client-supplier relationship in IT outsourcing. From an 
international business perspective, Dunning and Lundan (2010, p. 1229) assert “the 
complex interdependencies resulting from the overlapping of different institutional 
systems are increasingly difficult to predict and manage.” The model of the institutional 
elements here developed aims to support a better governance of a cross-border IT 
outsourcing, as the partnership building process is the main one for the success of this 
kind of client-supplier relationship (Bahli and Rivard, 2003). In a strict sense, the 
banking industry can benefit from the results of the present study in the IT offshore 
licensing processes.  
One of the limitations of this study is the impossibility to generalize its results, 
although it contributes to theoretical generalization (Yin, 2001). Another limitation 
refers to the qualitative content analysis. Bardin (1977, p. 115) calls attention to the fact 
that, although valid in the development of specific deductions in a precise inference 
category, it is not valid in general inferences. The identified categories may be subject 
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to question, since the analysis of the content, as a whole, is not exhaustive (Bardin, 
1977, p. 115). Nevertheless, its potential remains precisely in exploring the reduced 
corpus of data and establishing more discriminating categories. 
Finally, this study suggests three opportunities for future research, based on the 
model of the institutional elements developed. First, quantitative research projects with 
part of its elements, as they are several, when the use of exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis may be of great relevance. The model may require some modifications to 
assure its suitability for the observations collected through statistical significance. The 
second opportunity is the development of a similar model from the supplier perspective, 
as this work explored only the client perspective. The results may indicate a more 
holistic model to explain the client-supplier relationship in IT outsourcing. Finally, the 
third opportunity is to compare the results of this study with those of studies developed 
in a similar context. 
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